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RECENT DECISIONS
and liberty.8 Therefore the court ordinarily will permit a plea of
guilty to be withdrawn if it fairly appears that the prisoner was in
ignorance of his rights or was influenced unduly or improperly either
by hope or by fear in the making of it.9 Where the plea of guilty is
entered under belief, induced by the judge, that sentence less severe
than the maximum should be given, defendant should be allowed to
withdraw the plea.10 The same is true where such belief is induced
by the prosecuting attorney." Where, however, no sufficient grounds
for such a belief exists the court properly may deny its permission
for withdrawal.' 2 To make an act of the court in refusing leave to
withdraw a plea of guilty an abuse of discretion it must appear that
the plea was entered under some mistake, compulsion, or inducement
working injustice. 13 Such not appearing, defendant's motion was
properly denied.
J. I. G.

MORTGAGES-DEFICIENCY JUDGENT.-Plaintiff obtained judg-

ment of foreclosure and sale just prior to the effective date of
§1083-a' of the Civil Practice Act. Sale of premises under this
judgment was effected subsequent to the date this section became
operative. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should have reasonable
value of property ascertained before a deficiency judgment is granted.
Plaintiff contends that that section does not apply herein. Held,
judgment of foreclosure and sale is final and the statute, having no
retroactive effect, does not apply to the case at bar. Feiber Realty
Corp., et al. v. Abel, 265 N. Y. 94, 191 N. E. 847 (1934).
A judgment of foreclosure and sale has been held to be final
and an adjudication of all questions at issue.2 Therefore, judgment
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being final, the recipient has a vested rights which the legislature
cannot arbitrarily confiscate, recall, or put again in jeopardy. 4 While
this statute is remedial, 5 requiring that no judgment be granted for
any residue of the debt remaining unsatisfied where the mortgaged
property shall be sold during the emergency, except after an appraisal
and the reasonable market value of same has been ascertained, 6 and
should therefore be liberally construed, 7 a construction which would
give it retroactive operation is not favored by the courts.8 Unless
the language dearly and plainly indicated a contrary purpose, a
prospective construction will always be given.9 In the instant case,
the statute became effective in the interim between the rendering of
judgment and sale of the property and therefore has no effect.
A. S. G.

DIVORcE-RIGHT TO DISCONTINUE ACTION.-W instituted an
action for separation in which she obtained judgment and alimony.
The parties then entered into a separation agreement wherein a different financial arrangement was made. While the separation suit
was pending, but before judgment H went to Nevada and obtained
a divorce, W not appearing therein. Thereafter H remarried in a
foreign state. Thereupon, W commenced two actions: (1) against
H and his alleged second wife for a declaratory judgment and (2)
against H for specific performance of the separation agreement.
Personal service was had in each action. As a result of conferences,
W discontinued the two suits and brought an action for divorce
against H, who in consideration thereof agreed to make certain payments to her. The divorce action was started in good faith, H being
personally served. However, H defaulted on his payments and refused to comply with the terms of the separation agreement, whereupon W moved for leave to discontinue her divorce action. From
a denial of the motion W appealed. Held, reversed, the special circumstances present herein permit the granting of W's motion to
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